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Abstract 
 
This paper presents yet another personal reflection on one the most important concepts in 
both science and the humanities: time. This elusive notion has been not only bothering 
philosophers since Plato and Aristotle. It goes throughout human history embracing all 
analytical and creative (anthropocentric) disciplines. Time has been a central theme in 
physical and life sciences, philosophy, psychology, music, art and many more. This theme is 
known with a vast body of knowledge across different theories and categories. What has been 
explored concerns its nature (rational, irrational, arational), appearances/qualia, degrees, 
dimensions and scales of conceptualization (internal, external, fractal, discrete, continuous, 
mechanical, quantum, local, global, etc.). Of particular interest have been parameters of time 
such as duration ranges, resolutions, modes (present, now, past, future), varieties of tenses 
(e.g. present perfect, present progressive, etc.) and some intuitive, but also fancy 
phenomenological characteristics such as “arrow”, “stream”, “texture”, “width”, “depth”, 
“density”, even “scent”. Perhaps the most distinct characteristic of this fundamental concept 
is the absolute time constituting the flow of consciousness according to Husserl, the reflection 
of pure (human) nature without having the distinction between exo and endo. This essay is a 
personal reflection upon time in modern physics and phenomenological philosophy. 
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1. Prologue 
 
Space and time are particularly modalities of human consciousness. Whereas space can be 
realized through our eyes and limbs, time remains elusive to our minds and still bothers 
philosophers since antiquity (Dyke & Bardon, 2013). In the beginning of the 20th century 
science made a crucial switchover. Time was spatialized1. Until then the world was three-
dimensional. With the Special Relativity Theory (Einstein, 1905; Minkowski, 1909) the 
concept of time became the fourth dimension2 and an integral element of the new physical 
worldview. It caused confusion among many of Einstein’s contemporaries, and not only with 
its relativistic dilation in the well-known equation with the speed of light ť = t (1- (v/c)2)½.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  It could be argued that time was spatialized earlier. Though time and space were separate for Newton (something that Einstein 
challenged), the clock time he assumed was laid out like space and was devoid of the dynamism of Bergsonian durée, (Bergson, 
1912; Čapek, 1961).	  2	  It was Laplace who treated time as just another dimension equivalent to space, and thereby paved the way for the development 
of relativity theory as it came to be understood (but not as Čapek, following Bergson, understood it). 	  
This notion of relativistic time appeared wrong and unnatural, not without good reason, since:  
• Time is ineffable, eluding science and mathematics: it can only be grasped through 
intuition and shown indirectly and partially through images (Bergson, 1912).  
• Time is – concerning the extensities of the spatial – an intensity; it is a “qualitative, 
non-spatial, non-dimensional inwardness”3 (Portmann, 1952). 
• Time is a “heterogeneous dimension”, which lies “transversely” to the “upright to it 
standing space dimensions”…. “The 4th dimension is a  ‘dimensio sui generis’. 
Accurately phrased, it is not a ‘di-mension’, i.e. a dividing measure, but an a-
mension, i.e. an element free from division and measurement…. a basic phenomenon 
without spatial character. It is a quality, whereas the measurability of the spatial 
dimensions lets them appear as quantities4.” (Gebser, 1962). 
 
In short, “time is not a categorical, and hence not a conceivable size5. It appears as an 
acategorical element, which cannot be registered systematically, i.e. spatially, but only 
systatically”, when related to a combination or synthesis (systatics)6 (Gebser, 2011, p. 51ff). 
 
2. On time with time in physics: a personal perspective 
 
Let us step back for a moment to realize a crucial moment in the history of physics preceding 
the development of both Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. This was the 
recognition of the limited frame of reference for physical laws, related to the fundamental 
issue of time reversal (T-symmetry) invariance and Loschmidt’s Paradox, also known as the 
(ir)reversibility paradox. Newtonian mechanics, underlying low-level fundamental physical 
processes, is symmetric with respect to time reversal. “The equations of motion in abstract 
dynamics are perfectly reversible7; any solution of these equations remains valid when the 
time variable t is replaced by -t.” (Thompson, 1874). However, the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, describing the behavior of macroscopic systems, violates this principle. It 
determines a preferred direction of time’s arrow by stating that the statistical state of entropy 
of the entire universe, taken as a closed isolated system, will always increase “over time” and 
never be negative. Loschmidt was provoked by Boltzmann's attempt to derive the Second 
Law from classical kinetic theory. He objected that it should not be possible to deduce an 
irreversible process from time-symmetric dynamics. Therefore, classical mechanics and 
statistical mechanics, both supported by a large body of evidence, were in conflict and hence 
the paradox. Today we know that certain physical forces (and laws) prevail at certain scales 
and become negligible at others; they may have evolved (Wheeler, 1983; Deutsch, 1986; 
Josephson, 2012) and cannot be derived from each other across the scales, at least to this 
moment8. We also know “now” that (physical) time is asymmetric, except for equilibrium 
states9, where time symmetry holds. Generally, past, present and future cannot be exchanged 
in physics according to the Second Law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Die Zeit ist hinsichtlich der Extensitäten des Räumlichen eine Intensität, eine “qualitative, nichträumliche, nichtdimensionale 
Innerlichkeit”. [translation from German and italics by the author] 
4 Die Zeit ist eine “heterogene Dimension”, die “quer” zu den “senkrecht auf ihr stehenden Raumdimensionen” liegt... “Die 4. 
Dimension ist eine ‘Dimensio sui generis’. Sie ist exakt ausgedrückt, keine “Di-mension”, also eine einteilende Maßgröße, 
sondern eine A-mension, also ein von Maß und Messen befreites Element…. ein Grundphänomen, das kein Raumcharakter hat. 
Sie ist eine Qualität, während die Meßbarkeit der Raumdimensionen vornehmlich als Quantitäten erscheinen lässt. [translation 
from German and italics by the author] 
5 Time scales are realized, i.e. experienced or felt as a qualium with no size at all (Salthe, 2013). Accordingly, time passing 
would be experienced at any scale 'the same', even though it is clear that when observing much larger or much smaller systems, 
they appear to be experiencing time more slowly or more rapidly than the observer's experience. 
6 “Sie – die Zeit – ist keine kategoriale und damit vorstellbare Größe. Sie erscheint als akategoriales Element, das nicht 
systematisch, also räumlich zu erfassen ist, sondern nur systatisch”, d.h. in Bezug auf die Zusammenfügung der Teile zum 
Ganzen (Systase), “wahrnehmbar ist”.  [translation from German and italics by he author] 
7 However, motion itself is dissipative in the macroscopic case.	  
8 The search for a General Unification Theory underlying all physical laws continues. Bohm’s hidden variables (Bohm, 1952; 
Bohm, 1980) and Everett’s many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics (Everett, 1957a/b; Everett, 1973) could still be 
instructive in this quest, not only for physicists – with a few exceptions they have been always claiming to address (replicable) 
phenomena in their research – but also for phenomenological philosophers. 
9 with possibly another "exception from the exception" for quantum noninvasive measurements which are supposed to violate 
time symmetry even in equilibrium (Bednorz et al., 2013). 
The Special Relativity Theory brought essentially the abolishment of simultaneity 10 . 
Accordingly, it is impossible11 to say in an absolute sense that two distinct events occur at the 
same time if those events are separated in space. Both Einstein and Poincaré came to the same 
conclusion explicitly referring to the concept of simultaneity (Einstein, 1905; Poincaré, 
1898/1913). Before the arrival of Special Relativity space was considered a slice of reality cut 
by simultaneity, and (global) time required simultaneity to define valid relationships between 
objects in the universe. When simultaneity was abolished, both space and time were 
eliminated, at least in their classical meaning. If simultaneity is out, both space and time 
become meaningless as global parameters. Thus, physics rescued both concepts by assigning 
them local (relative) roles in a 4-dimensional space-time or time-space continuum. But in 
relativistic physics there are no global space and no global12 time anymore. There is a global 
space-time (or time-space), which is locally manifested as space and time. Abandoning only 
one of these concepts does not make sense13 according to Special Relativity. Where there is 
space, there is time. They go hand in hand.  
 
In fact the statements “time (or space) exists” and “time (or space) doesn’t exist” imply 
something of a linguistic paradox. I am going to discuss this in some detail here, because it 
makes explicit an interesting cognition about the topic of this essay. This is the appraisal that 
different disciplines often use or borrow from each other’s definitions and ontologies with 
different context to conceptualize their perspective upon a subject. We experience in our 
everyday lives that most misunderstandings between scientists and philosophers, but also 
among scientists and philosophers within their own domains, are due to this problem. A more 
systematic approach to cross- and intra-cultural multilogue (Bateson, 1972) is required.  
 
I shall come now to the point. Existence (E) or non-existence (~E) is one of the most 
fundamental forms of human experience. Relativity theory postulates the absolute existence 
of space-time (or time-space). This projects in an observer’s coordinates to existing space and 
existing time. But for an observer space exists “en-bloc” as thing/object (Gebser, 1962), while 
time exists as a process, durée (Bergson, 1912). This is an important distinction. A physicist 
adopting this wrong premise can state that relativity theory, which makes space and time 
observer dependent, eliminates existence as a fundamental concept. S/he may claim that 
existence requires a predefined concept of time, implying a temporal logic with operators 
such as ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘always’, ‘never’, ‘eventually’, ‘sometimes’, etc., in order to be 
applied within a postulate (suggestion or assumption of the existence, fact, or truth of 
something as a basis for reasoning). Mathematically it is not correct to describe spatial 
existence, temporal existence or the existence of a process (time) as one and the same thing14. 
In mathematics we have existence that is only logical and does not refer to either space or 
time. In the mathematical context we can discuss a process by adding a temporal operator or 
subscript, e.g. ☐ P or P☐ meaning “always P (holds)”. But philosophically the situation is 
more complex. The issue is that existence of processes is a point of view of physicists15. But 
processes exist differently than non-temporal entities. One cannot just make logical 
arguments about relations that are mathematically ill defined.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 To claim this was the only way to reconcile with the constant speed of light in all inertial reference systems. Therefore it could 
be probably more correct to say that special relativity brought the observer dependence. [annotation by Felix T. Hong] 
11 In a way, the elimination of simultaneity by the Special Relativity is analogous to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in 
Quantum Mechanics. 
12 The local concept of time was also discussed in earlier works of Salthe in connection with scale in the compositional hierarchy 
(Salthe, 1985; 1993), where he discussed small-scale moments nested within large scale ones involving the idea of 'cogent 
moment' for each scale. The local concept of time becomes also interesting when looking at it within a multi-agent system, i.e. in 
terms of mutually referenced ‘change’ relationships in concurrent multi-agent systems.  
13 mathematically and because most physicists tend to take space as given/existent 
14 [personal correspondence with Louis H. Kauffman, May 2015] 
15 Let’s consider the existence of the Spacetime Manifold and call it M. In the mathematical models of physics M has 
mathematical existence. Physicists think of M as being “real”. And they even think of how it may be embedded in higher 
dimensional spaces. This sort of reality is beyond time in the sense that we have time ‘inside’ M. So it would appear that 
physicists believe in the reality of certain mathematical structures beyond spatial realities. Of course they do. They believe for 
instance in the reality of the Hilbert spaces for quantum theory, quarks, strings, etc. We could imagine that these ‘realities’ can 
have physical correlates with given mathematical existences. [personal correspondence with Louis H. Kauffman, May 2015] 
Mathematicians define mathematical structures to bring them into mathematical existence. 
But they cannot define definition. Nobody (except logicians!) can. That is, (most) 
mathematicians, but also scientists and philosophers, base their definitions on their ability to 
make distinctions. But mathematicians cannot define what is a distinction! Nobody can. What 
is a distinction is founded in human experience. Mathematicians cannot define what is 
experience either! It is the case that mathematical definitions come from human experience 
and are built in such a way that they can be exchanged like tokens of information. This is how 
we close the loop from science and mathematics back to phenomenology. In L.H. Kauffman’s 
words: “Of course we can be as precise as possible about certain aspects of our experience. 
Thus I can tell you how to bake a cake, or give you the steps in a proof of a theorem, or tell 
you the complex steps that will lead you to observe the momentum exchanges that convince 
us of the existence of neutrinos. I can ask you to report your dreams. All sorts of relatively 
well-defined activities surround experiences that we have. But there will never be a logical 
mathematical definition of experience.” Therefore, we should be happy to live in a formally 
incomplete world, which allows both space and time for experiencing anything. Nevertheless, 
for the purpose of discussing our example, let us adopt the convention that a process and an 
object are one and the same thing, despite the fact that the problem I will talk about is 
mathematically “ill-defined”16. It will only illustrate better the situation of a “compromised” 
communication. This special prerequisite is often neglected by philosophers and physicists 
and in no time we have a problem with time and other things.  Let us have the physicist 
stating that experience (experience of existence) does not have any representation within the 
world described by Special Relativity. In other words, the relativistic view of the world 
eliminates the possibility of existence as a primary form of experience. Hence, the paradox of 
(non-)existence of time: 
o If time/space exists, E(t/s) = 1 or True(E(t/s)), then the proposition “time/space 
exists”,  is true: t/s(E(t/s)) = 1 or True(t/s(E(t/s))), i.e. True(E(t/s)) <=> E(t/s).  
o If time/space does not exist, E(t/s) = 0 or False(E(t/s)), the proposition “time/space 
does not exist”, t/s(E(t/s)) = 0 or False(t/s(E(t/s))), i.e. False(E(t/s)) <=> ~E(t/s) 
a) becomes meaningless for the physicist. This is indeed a very strong form of 
Aristotelian truth statement that physicists use to assess real-world 
situations17. If time and space do not exist in their classical meaning as 
absolute parameters, there is no interdependence between them. But they 
exist as local observer-dependent parameters according to the new meaning 
given to them by Special Relativity. Therefore, time and space can be 
interdependent in that sense. For a physicist’s pragmatic logic, based on 
observable and provable facts if time or space does not exist, there is no 
notion of it, and hence we cannot build a proposition using it. So the claim is 
indefinite or meaningless18. 
b) still makes sense19 for a mathematician/logician, without respect to such 
parameters as space and time: if <whatever> does not exist, the assertion 
“<whatever> does not exist” is true in the sense of Tarski, (Tarski, 1995).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Computer scientists use such pragmatic conventions. For instance, the programming language Scala addresses functions as 
software objects, to implement the extension of its underlying object-oriented language (Java) with elements of a general-
purpose functional programming language (Haskell). 17	  We	  can	  assume	  that	  “reality” is a kind of “social construction”, or more generally “construction”. Salthe claims there is no 
real world as such [June, 2015, personal correspondence]. Indeed, in terms of his hierarchy theory (Salthe, 1985), this expanded 
“phenomenological” relation can be described as: {biological construction {social construction {individual construction}}}.  
18 What is assumed in this claim of physicists is that only a human being embedded in a reality with time can make sense of 
something. However, Kant, Spinoza, the neoplatonists and the Löbian machine (Marchal, 1990; 1992; 2013; 2015) believe that 
something can make sense independently of the presence or existence of a human being. From their viewpoint phenomenological 
philosophers and physicists are on the same anthropocentric side of reasoning. 19	  This proposition does not make sense in case that we imply some kind of a priori reasoning about the nature of space and time. 
Special Relativity adopts such kind of implicit knowledge as a convention, which can be expressed as a second order logic. 	  
Consequently, the linguistic paradox20 leading the physicist to the conclusion that there must 
be space (and time) cannot be seen as such by the mathematician, even if s/he adopts the 
convention of taking objects and processes as the same things. The reader is witnessing two 
different descriptions of the world, the one of the physicist and the one of the mathematician 
making a compromise. We should not forget that there is also another, third world view of the 
philosopher, which makes at least21 three different types of phenomenology: 
 
• phenomenology of the physicist ! "pragmatic logic” 
• phenomenology of the philosopher ! “general (self-referential) logic” 
• phenomenology of the mathematician ! "machine (intelligence) logic” 
 
All of these logics come from a person’s different layers of experience (undefinable in 
mathematics), which cannot be perfectly matched. This is where all the troubles of 
interdisciplinary exchange come from. Most disciplines are closed in themselves and use 
local jargons of spoken languages (e.g. English). When their representatives speak to each 
other across and within disciplines, they usually understand different things. So, we cannot be 
precise enough when talking about something.  
 
The reasoning of the physicist in the above example is basically the following22:  
 
relativity = relative separation of space and time ! existence requires concept of 
time (because of paradox) ! existence becomes relative (a strange consequence) !  
because experience requires existence and/or existence is the most fundamental 
experience, relativity excludes these concepts as a matter of arbitrary23 choice. 
 
The argument that if time or space does not exist, then the proposition that “time or space 
does not exist” becomes meaningless is not easy to comprehend by a non-physicist (because 
of its implicit second-order logic). This assumes that the meaning of a term is something that 
exists that it refers to. Even Bertrand Russell who argued for a referential theory of meaning 
would not go this far, but accept that one could refer to fictional objects such as unicorns or 
non-existent theoretical objects such as tachyons24. However, the relativistic worldview 
eliminates possibility of existence as a primary form of experience. Therefore, as long as 
experience and existence have the same equal ontological status as tachyons and unicorns in 
relativity, there is no problem with physics. But what does it mean to exist? Plato suggested 
that it could mean anything that can causally influence or be causally influenced by anything 
else, i.e. it can act something or be acted upon by something. This concept does not help 
much with categorizing time and space. According to Aristotle, there should be no time and 
space, because they are not causally connected to anything. However, it is also necessary to 
distinguish between what is in Aristotle’s terminology ousia, or primary being, and what can 
only be understood as an aspect of a primary being. Thus, an atom can be considered as a 
primary being and existing as such (unless it is nothing but an intense curvature of space-
time, in which case it only exists as an aspect of a primary being – spacetime). What might be 
meant is that it could be conceived to exist by itself irrespective of anything else. The question 
is what defines a primary being. Is this definition (in Aristotle’s sense) supposed to be 
anthropocentric or not? If not, than the numbers 0 and 1 could be also taken for primary 
beings. This is e.g. the position of Digital Philosophy (Fredkin, 2003).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  In particular, 'exist' as an English (or basically, a Latin) verb, a form, which preferentially refers to an action, taking place in 
time. The existence of space-time fits poorly into this context. Thus, “the syntax of Korean has no true adjectives: they are a form 
of verb, so that a red ball becomes a redness-expressing ball and ‘cogito ergo sum’ becomes more like thought happens, 
therefore I exist. (To say that Koreans would start with na-nuhn, 'with reference to me'.) Therefore, discussions of existence are 
too often, unrecognized, discussions of syntax in one language or language family”. [annotation by Tim Poston]	  
21 We appear to be a priori more multiplied than with Everett’s multiverse theory (Everett, 1957a/b; Everett, 1973). How to 
suppose an easy cultural understanding then? [personal correspondence with Bruno Marchal, May 2015]  
22 [personal correspondence with Marcin J. Schroeder, May 2015] 23	  Since all locales, events, and objects are unique, that means that all actual things are arbitrary. 
24 [personal correspondence with Arran Gare: June 2015] 
Another illustration could be the status of space and time in Newtonian mechanics. For 
Newton, there would be space if there were no matter, and time if there were neither space 
nor matter. Time in this case would be the ultimate primary being, where space would be seen 
as existing and maintaining its existence through time. Matter is located in space and endures 
through time. Hence,	   when	   asking	   whether	   time	   exists,	   one	   could	   be	   arguing	   about	  whether	  Newton	  was	   right.	  However,	   one	   could	   also	   be	   asking	   about	  whether	   time	   is	  
experienced,	  with	  a	  privileged	  ‘now’	  with	  a	  past	  that	  used	  to	  be	  ‘now’,	  and	  a	  future	  that	  is	  very	  different	   from	  the	  past	  because	   it	   is	  not	  yet,	  but	  will	  become	   ‘now’.	  This	  could	  be	  Husserl’s	   very	   personal,	   experienced	   view	  on	   time.	   Time	   so	   conceived	  might	   not	   be	   a	  primary	  being,	  but	  rather	  an	  aspect	  of	  what	  there	  is,	  with	  reality	  conceived	  as	  processes	  that	   change	   in	   themselves	   and	   relate	   to	   each	   other.	   This	   kind	   of	   time	   is	   a	   parameter	  
accompanying	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  experiencer.	  What	  is	  really	  being	  argued	  in	  the	  former	  case	  is:	  “Are	  there	  causal	  processes?”.	  The	  latter	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  relational	  theory	  of	  time,	  which	  by	  rejecting	  Newton’s	  theory	  of	  time,	  is	  sometimes	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  time	  does	  not	  exist.	  However,	  if	  contrasted	  with	  Parmenides	  or	  some	  notion	  of	  the	  universe	  being	  a	  deterministic	  space-­‐time	  block,	  as	  Einstein	  believed,	  and	  which	  many	  physicists	  believe,	   it	   could	  be	   taken	  as	   a	  defense	  of	   the	   reality,	   i.e.	  existence,	   of	   time.	  We	  will	   see	  later	  that	  reality	  itself	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  social	  (i.e.	  shared,	  at	  least	  2nd	  person	  view)	  construct.	   In	   general,	   time	   always	   has	   also	   a	   surreal	   (i.e.	   individual,	   subjective)	  component.	   
 
If the second law of thermodynamics is considered to describe “real” (existing) phenomena, it 
is often taken to imply the “reality” (existence) of time and “time’s arrow” as Prigogine 
argued (at this level25 of description), although this is time understood as an aspect of causal 
processes. If the whole of “reality” can be grasped by some ultimate equations in which there 
is no reason to regard the relation between the present and the past and the present and the 
future – these are e.g. the cases of Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s field theory – this 
can be taken to imply that time does not exist (at that level of description!), although what is 
being denied is time as Prigogine understood it. 
 
The problem with the theories of relativity is the absence (or uncertainty) of simultaneity, and 
that what is taken to be a difference in time from a different reference frame, could be taken 
at least in part a difference in space. This is a very confusing detail, if time and space are 
considered as primary beings. However, if time and space are understood as aspects of 
processes, the issue is a lot less problematic, and can be interpreted to defend the reality 
(presence) of time. This is what Čapek argued (Čapek, 1961), claiming that in relativity 
theory there is never any questioning of the direction of causal influence, and the past is what 
can influence anything in the present, while the future is what can be causally influenced by 
what is in the present. The past and the future are then seen separated by a wedge of the 
‘elsewhere’. So, time is affirmed as a real aspect of what there is, while space as simultaneity 
is denied, and defined entirely in terms of time. Čapek argued that we should speak of time-
space and not space-time, and Bohm followed him in this. However, it is generally accepted 
that Newton’s framework of space and time is obsolete26 today. The trouble remains that 
relativity theory and quantum theory are incompatible, as Einstein, Podolski and Rosen 
pointed out (Einstein et al., 1935) in order to bring quantum theory into question. Yet Aspect 
and his colleagues have shown with their “Bell test experiments” that, it is quantum theory 
that is validated, not relativity theory (Aspect, 1982a/b). They provided the proof that a 
quantum event at one location can affect27 another event at a different location without 
respect to the distance and any obvious mechanism for communication between them.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 We will see this later in the discussion of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. 
26 with yet such exceptions as the Hořava-Lifshitz gravity theory (Hořava, 2009) about short-distance interactions between non-
relativistic gravitons, giving birth to the effective speed of light, Newton’s constant and the cosmological constant altogether. 
27 This claim is not correct because: a) “can affect” is a causation statement, but correlation is not causation; and b) instantaneity 
is mistakenly read into these experiments as if the quantum entanglement was only between simultaneous states, but physicists 
have recently shown that quantum correlation is possible between photon pairs that never coexisted (Megidish et al., 2013). 
With quantum entanglement, there is a sense that the entire universe is interconnected 
instantaneously. Yet, it is not clear of how this is to be interpreted, in the context of relativity 
theory, where the speed of light is the highest possible velocity in the universe. Gravity, in 
turn, cannot be quantized as the other known forces of interaction. In conclusion, it is not 
clear how space and time are to be interpreted as a consequence. Čapek's (1961) and Bohm's 
(1965) interpretations of relativity theory were remarkable in the past, but they may become 
obsolete, without a proper replacement. The perfect confusion continues today28…  
 
… unless we allow the mediation of a creative agency (Deutsch, 2012; Josephson, 2015a/b). 
This puts the quest on a different ground that becomes apparent towards the end of this paper.  
 
If experience is taken as a fundamental concept (e.g. in philosophical phenomenology), then 
relativity becomes a purely formal and practically useful description of the world, but useless 
for philosophical reflection. From the viewpoint of a pure abstract mathematician a physicist 
is also a kind of “phenomenological philosopher” putting the grounds of his/her reasoning not 
on contemplation and personal experience (the philosopher type of logic), but on pragmatic 
theoretical reasoning and (experienced) experimentation (using devices as extensions of 
human senses); both views are anthropocentric29. In contrast, the logic of the mathematician is 
universal30. Therefore if we speak of time, there must be some unspoken evidence (or 
convention) of its physical and psychical presence, without regard to how it can be defined. 
The trick with the substitution we made to represent a process as an object in order to carry 
out logical conclusions about the (non-)existence of time31 at the same level of representation 
assumes a particular split32 of space and time in the spacetime universe. It is generally not 
easy to find a common denominator for the individual phenomenological logics, which may 
also partly exclude each other. This field requires further exploration. The “problem of time” 
is well known in physics33 and philosophy (Dyke & Bardon, 2013). The linguistic paradox I 
have discussed in detail here demonstrates only a small part of the reefs we can expect when 
steering a project in the inshore waters between such big islands of knowledge as physics, 
philosophy and mathematics. We will come back to it later when discussing a recent version 
of the Block Universe34 Theory (Skow, 2005; Skow 2015).  
 
Special Relativity challenged classical physics with its homogeneous and continuous structure 
of space and duration of time. The Newtonian concepts of space and time are linked, yet are 
independent of each other within the Aristotelian framework of object-in-space-(and-time)-
before-subject (Rosen 2008a; Rosen 2008b). Space and time in everyday life constitute the 
classical arena in which physicists observe bodies in motion and measure (the pace of) 
changes they participate in via time-invariant mathematical equations. Precision, prediction 
and preclusion of hazards (causality) are good reasons in a pragmatic, extroverted world 
embossed by goals and virtues. Einstein’s notion of time’s relativity35 was based on ideas of 
Hume and Mach (Norton, 2010). It banned the ether 36  from modern physics 37 . Yet 
philosophers like Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty continued to bother about 
time from a quite different perspective (Canales, 2015; Rosen, 2015).  
 
Let us now open a new parenthesis and ask: what is time that we, human beings, experience? 
The mathematical equation for an ideal gas undergoing a reversible adiabatic process pV/nT = 
R = const. is an example for the interdependence of parameters with different nature.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 [personal correspondence with Arran Gare, June 2015]	  
29 They are equally social constructions. [personal correspondence with Stanley Salthe, June 2015] 30	  This should be considered as a general claim. Mathematicians can differ on logic, e.g. classical logic vs. intuitionist logic.  
31 As we will see later in the discussion of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, this is a question of local/global or exo/endo relativism. 
32 A recent quantum field theory of gravity also suggested this comeback to a Newtonian nonrelativistic scheme (Hořava, 2009).  
33 http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Problem_of_time. 
34 also known as Steady State Universe. Relativity Theory and Newtonian Cosmology are usually taken as reference examples. 35	  Cogent moment  (Salthe, 1993) is also a kind of relativity in time (dilaton); Pattee speaks of hierarchy timescales (Pattee, 1973) 
36 (Fresnel, 1819; Lorentz, 1899; Poincaré, 1904/6; Poincaré, 1906) 
37 However, Bohm suggested a more subtle idea of ether later (Bohm, 1952, 1980).  
Planck’s equation about quantum energy is another example: const.= h = ET (E = hv = h/T). 
Whereas T denotes temperature in the former equation, it means time in the latter. Does 
temperature tell us something about the underlying molecular kinetics of the ideal gas? No. 
What tells us time in the second equation then? Deutsch uses the above example of a 
conservation law to demonstrate Wheeler’s arguments that symmetry and invariance are 
always indicative of a lower level of structure than the one being described, while at the same 
time they mask the nature of this structure (Deutsch, 1986). This statement surprisingly 
reminds of Bohm’s hidden variables interpretation of quantum theory (Bohm, 1952; Bohm, 
1980) and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (Gödel, 1931).  
 
Doesn’t this appraisal of consistently lower levels of (related) physical reality down to 
molecules, hadrons and strings also apply for the equation of relativistic time dilation? Is not 
time also a kind of intertwined relation among entities of the underlying reality involving both 
the subject and the object, the container and the contained, the process and the processed? 
Isn’t there a deeper level of description of the observable universe in which time doesn’t 
appear at all38? Is it conceivable that time can only emerge in some sort of approximate 
description of reality by other means? Is it possible to estimate a potentiality of time? How 
many faces is time showing us? Are there different phenomenological interpretations of 
temporal relativity from the ones of the objectifying 3rd person descriptions of continuous 
space-time in Einstein’s Special and General Relativity (Einstein, 1916) and fractal space-
time in Nottale’s Scale Relativity39 (Nottale, 1993) inherent to the discontinuity thesis in 
quantum theory? Vrobel suggests to unify Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of 
nowness as a 1st person’s perception of depth (associated with individually registered 
superposition of events) involving the rationalization of systemic blind spots (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945) and the one of temporal length (“cogent moment”, Salthe, 1993) or duration (associated 
with the individually registered successive flow of events, Vrobel, 2013) from the perspective 
of the obserpant, the observer-participant who represents the model of the system itself 
(Vrobel, 2015). This approach is supposed to deliver an integral description of the subjective 
reality under investigation involving these two locally experienced (and possibly a few more) 
temporal scales (“timescales”, Pattee, 1973) and tenses (Matsuno & Salthe, 2002) into one 
overall “fractal dimension” of superposed and sequenced events, known as density of time 
(Vrobel, 2007). These new scales of time are proposed to replace the single dimension in 
Einstein’s relativistic model. However, even then, there must be still something elusively 
foundational remaining beyond such kind of indicative relativism in phenomenology. This 
evidence could be usually recognized in the method of integration or in the way of writing 
equations about the individual components of time. But integration techniques really 
eliminate the flow of time, since we know the beginning state and the final one; this is the 
Block Universe model! How would it be possible to allow for a comprehensible transition 
from one phenomenological domain of relevance to another (boundary conditions), as this is 
the case in Einstein’s and Nottale’s objective40 relativities? Should we distinguish further 
fragmentations within and between phenomenological and non-phenomenological scales and 
descriptions, as this is the case with continuous and discrete functions in mathematics?  
 
Phenomenological philosophy claims that time is not the place, the scene, the container or the 
medium for events (changes), nor a dimension along which everything flows (Desanti, 1968; 
1975). According to Desanti, a French scholar of Husserl, we should forget “the ordinary 
meaning of the preposition "in" we spontaneously use when we talk about our experience of 
time. It is even this use, so ancient that should be the subject of our review. Really it would be 
strange that what we have learned to call "time" can contain anything. And yet we say without 
anxiety: "It is time that everything goes."  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Yet not with the cogent moment idea. [personal correspondence with Stanley Salthe, June 2015] 
39 Scale Relativity could possibly accommodate Salthe’s “cogent moment” idea; this is actually not the case. 	  40	  “These are externalist concepts. A cogent moment is an externalist assessment of internalist experiences. Maybe that is why so 
many find it difficult.” [personal correspondence with Stanley Salthe, May, 2015] 
But what is happening "in" time does not remain as a place.41 (Desanti 1992, p. 104). In fact, 
this is the major objection of Bergson against Einstein’s Special Relativity (Canales, 2015), 
that he has dimensioned42 time, something immeasurable in the same way as space, which is, 
of course (in everyday life), measurable43. This kind of reasoning in phenomenology is not 
that far from the one in modern physics.  
 
“There is a deeper problem, perhaps going back to the origin of physics... time is 
frozen as if it were another dimension of space. Motion is frozen, and a whole history 
of constant motion and change is presented to us as something static and 
unchanging… We have to find a way to unfreeze time — to represent time without 
turning it into space.” (Smolin, 2006, pp. 256-257). 
 
“Today, the novelty that comes from quantum gravity is that space does not exist. … 
But combining this idea with relativity, one must conclude that the non-existence of 
space also implies the non-existence of time. Indeed, this is exactly what happens in 
quantum gravity: the variable t does not appear in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, or 
elsewhere in the basic structure of the theory. … Time does not exist.”44 (Rovelli, 
2012, p. 127, Kindle Ed.) 
 
The claim about the imaginary, surreal, even exotic nature of time is not new in philosophy 
and physics (Mach, 1893; MacTaggard, 1908; Bairlein et al., 1962; Bedini, 1963; Barbour, 
2001; Anderson, 2004; Rovelli & Vodotto, 2014). Of course, there have always been, too, 
physicists defending the real existence of time, even so real to define such a quantum variable 
as the chronon (Lévi,1927; Yang, 1947; Caldrola, 1980; Farias & Recami, 1997) with the 
idea in mind to reconcile special and general relativity with quantum field theory. This 
“atom” of time was supposed to be the duration for light to travel the distance of the classical 
(non-quantum) radius of an electron (Margenau, 1977). This model implies a lowest level of 
actuality, as asserted in the Planck scale. 
 
In his book “Time Reborn” Smolin argues that physicists have inappropriately banned the 
reality of time because they confuse their timeless mathematical models with reality45, 
(Smolin, 2013). His claim was that time is both real (which means external to him) and 
fundamental, hypothesizing that the very laws of physics are not fixed, but evolve over time46. 
This stance is not really a new one (cf. Wheeler, 1983; Page & Wootters, 1983). But it means 
again an absolute external reference axis and a direction for placing events in a sequence, 
which phenomenologists decline as the only option. Some of them, partly inspired by the late 
works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, approach time neither from the standpoint of 
simultaneity alone, nor from that of succession. For instance, the dualism of these two 
concepts is surpassed in favor of a temporal dialectic in which simultaneity and succession 
are entwined (Rosen, 2008a/b), without denying their separate meanings. Heidegger's concept 
of "true time" speaks to this approach to phenomenology.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  “le sens ordinaire de la préposition ‘dans’ que nous utilisons spon-tanément lorsque nous parlons de notre expérience du 
temps. C’est même cet usage, tellement ancien, qui devrait faire l’ob-jet de notre examen. Vraiment il serait étrange que ce que 
nous avons appris à nommer ‘temps’ puisse contenir quoi que ce soit. Et cependant nous disons sans inquiétude: C’est dans le 
temps que tout se passe. Or ce qui se passe ‘dans’ le temps n’y demeure pas comme en un lieu.”  [translation from French and 
italics by the author] 42	  Salthe’s “cogent moments” and Pattee’s “timescales” are also dimensioning time. Yet, as being felt, they are immeasurable. 
Thus, we have again two perspectives on internalist time: the natural scientist’s one and he the phenomenologist’s one. Are they 
identical? Isn’t Merleau-Ponty’s depth and Vrobel’s density time concepts describing the methods of realizing these hierarchies? 
43 Yet, even space is the result of gravitation according to General Relativity (Einstein, 1916).  
44 “Aujourd'hui, la nouveauté qui nous vient de la gravitation quantique est que l'espace n'existe pas. … Mais en combinant cette 
idée avec la relativité restreinte, on doit conclure que la non-existence de l'espace implique aussi la non-existence du temps. En 
effet, c'est exactement ce qui se passe en gravité quantique: la variable t ne figure pas dans l'équation de Wheeler-DeWitt, ni 
ailleurs, dans la structure de base de la théorie. … Le temps n'existe pas.”  [translation from French and italics by the author] 
45 Did not Einstein do the same with the ether? 
46 a typical phrase, used by most physicists, often without being aware of its semantics. 
In fact, Smolin appealed for a more philosophical approach to physics and to the issue of time 
(Smolin, 2006), but he didn’t realize the necessity of a phenomenological approach. However, 
some scientists began to comprehend the importance of the phenomenological projection 
(Vrobel, 2015). 
 
Constructor Theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a 
dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations (Deutsch, 2012). 
Accordingly, a task A is said to be possible (A✓) if the laws of nature impose no restrictions 
on how (accurately) A could be performed, nor on how well the agents that are capable of 
approximately performing it could retain their ability to do so. Otherwise A is considered to 
be impossible (A✘ ). Deutsch argues that in both quantum theory and general relativity, “time 
is treated anomalously”. He sees the problem in that time is not among the entities to which 
both theories attribute “objective existence (namely quantum observables and geometrical 
objects respectively), yet those entities change with time”. Is not this an interesting appraisal? 
According to him “there is widespread agreement that there must be a way of treating time 
‘intrinsically’ (i.e. as emerging from the relationships between physical objects such as 
clocks, e.g. Page & Wootters 1983; Barbour 2001; Barbour, 2012) rather than ‘extrinsically’ 
(as an unphysical parameter on which physical quantities somehow depend).” However, 
Deutsch reckons, it would be difficult to accommodate this in the prevailing conception, 
“every part of which (initial state; laws of motion; time-evolution) assumes that extrinsic 
status”. According to Constructor Theory it is “both natural and unavoidable to treat both 
time and space intrinsically: they do not appear in the foundations of the theory, but are 
emergent properties of classes of tasks …”. Note that the differentiation between “intrinsic” 
and “extrinsic” has different meaning than the one used in phenomenological philosophy.  
 
Other projections, such as the Circular Theory (Yardley, 2010) and the Structural Theory of 
Everything (Josephson, 2015a) also question the laws underlying the foundations of physics. 
However, as long as they consider placing events “over time” extrinsically, they are all of the 
same kind: non-phenomenological47. (Note that duration has two definitions: endo and exo.) 
This is a very interesting conclusion in Steven M. Rosen’s words: “The point may be that, in 
physics, time is treated ‘extrinsically’ because it does not lend itself to being formulated in 
objectivist terms, i.e., as something that is limited to the context of the objectified physical 
world.”48 Therefore, the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” in Deutsch’s objectivist usage are 
both “extrinsic” in the phenomenological sense: both are limited to a physicalistic paradigm 
that excludes the internal perspective of a lived (bodily) subjectivity or an agent-dependent 
reality (Rössler, 1987), a continuing durée (Bergson, 1912). This appears to be the key to all 
the “trouble with physics” (Smolin, 2006), and not only with physics49.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 I dare to ask whether the laws underlying the foundations of physics are not purely phenomenological, and whether because of 
this subtle nature they have been escaping physicists to this moment. Signals for involving an introspective view on the creation 
of the universe can be recognized in (Barad, 2007), (Yardley, 2010) and (Josephson, 2015b). It is possibly worth venturing a 
contrasting juxtaposition of the articles in the following section of this special issue dedicated to mathematical and computational 
phenomenology (Hipólito, 2015; Kauffman, 2015; Ehresmann & Gomez-Ramirez, 2015; Marchal, 2015; Goranson et al., 2015), 
as well as their precursors in the 2013 special issue on Integral Biomathics (Goranson & Cardier, 2013; Marchal, 2013). 
48 [personal correspondence with Steven M. Rosen, May 2015]	  
49 In their 2012 paper No entailing laws, but enablement in the evolution of the biosphere Longo, Montévil and Kauffman claim 
that biological evolution “marks the end of a physics world view of law entailed dynamics” (Longo et al., 2012). They argue that 
the evolutionary phase space or space of possibilities constituted of interactions between organisms, biological niches and 
ecosystems is “ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate and even (mathematically) unprestatable”. Hence, the authors’ claim 
that it is impossible to know “ahead of time the 'niches' which constitute the boundary conditions on selection” in order to 
formulate laws of motion for evolution. They call this effect “radical emergence”, from life to life. In their study of biological 
evolution, Longo and colleagues carried close comparisons with physics. They investigated the mathematical constructions of 
phase spaces and the role of symmetries as invariant preserving transformations, and introduced the notion of “enablement” to 
restrict causal analyses to Batesonian differential cases (1972: "the difference that makes a difference"). The authors have shown 
that mutations or other “causal differences” at the core of evolution enable the establishment of non-conservation principles, in 
contrast to physical dynamics, which is largely based on conservation principles as symmetries. Their new notion of “extended 
criticality” also helps to understand the distinctiveness of the living state of matter when compared to the non-animal one. 
However, their approach to both physics and biology is also non-phenomenological. The possibility for endo states that can 
trigger the “(genetic) switches of mutation” has not been examined in their model. All sciences are (still) externalist. 
Hawking’s “Brief history of time” (Hawking, 1988) also conveys a purely objectivist-
extrinsic model. His response to the firewall (or event horizon) paradox of the black hole 
(Almheiri  et al., 2013) in early 2014 (Hawking, 2014) dug a hole in the black hole research 
(his own domain) opting for no event horizon at all. This was because quantum effects caused 
wild space-time fluctuations. In effect, the headline news in Nature and elsewhere was: 
“There are no black holes.” (Meral, 2014). This announced the end of modern physics, as we 
know it. Time was placed somewhere “out there”, away from the astronaut who was falling 
into a black hole. The theory speculated that the position of the event horizon is not locally 
determined. It is a function of the future of the spacetime” (whatever this may mean). In 
contrast, ontological phenomenology introduces a dialectical blending of  “out there” and “in 
here”, (Matsuno, 1995, 1998; Rosen, 2008a/b). Accordingly, time could be associated with 
the internal aspects of the inner-outer blend, while the astronaut falling towards the black 
hole (object-in-space) and experiencing the now constitutes the external aspect.  
 This	   is	  quite	  different	   from	  Einstein’s	   twin	  paradox	  and	  means	   that	  we	   cannot	   simply	  relegate	   (special	   and	   general	   relativity)	   time	   to	   an	   external,	   merely	   objective,	   reality.	  Neither	   can	  we	   simply	   link	   it	   to	   the	   internal	  world	  of	   the	  obserpant.	  Rather,	   time	   is	   a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  internal	  aspect	  of	  a	  reality	  in	  which	  inner	  and	  outer	  are	  thoroughly	  
intertwined50	  (superposed)	   (Rosen,	   2015).	   Paradoxically	   enough,	   theoretical	   physicists	  have	   not	   discovered	   a	   simple	   trick	   of	   expressing	   the	   objectivist	   stance,	   or	   3rd	   person	  description,	  in	  terms	  of	  (a)	  subjectivist	  one(s),	  or	  1st	  person	  description(s),	  with	  the	  help	  of	   an	   ideal	  obserpant	  body	   size	  of	  zero	   (Vrobel,	  2015),	   thus	  allowing	   for	   the	   ‘exo’	   and	  ‘endo’	  to	  become	  the	  same	  instance51.	   
 
Sean Carroll, while being also an adversary of timeless physics, reasons that questioning the 
reality of time does not make sense, because it is “just there”, i.e. it appears to exist, but 
maybe not as a fundamental or emergent property of the world (Carroll, 2010). In his opinion 
“the claim ‘time does not exist’ certainly doesn’t mean the same kind of thing, as ‘unicorns 
do not exist’”52. This argument seems reasonable: finally we speak of apples and oranges, 
especially if we are put in front of an audience of physicists, phenomenologists and 
mathematicians. This stance leads back again to the ideal gas law and Wheeler’s argument 
about invariance and symmetry associated with lower levels of the (related) physical reality. 
The reader may recall the earlier discussion about Deutsch’s reference to the conservation law 
of a reversible adiabatic process with an ideal gas (pV/nT = R = const.). 
 
Why does time matter so much for us? There is something interesting as a corollary of all 
these viewpoints about time (even only in physics) put in the words of Sean Carroll53: 
 
“Temperature and pressure didn’t stop being real once we understood them as 
emergent properties of an underlying atomic description. The question of whether 
time is fundamental or emergent is, on the other hand, crucially important. I have no 
idea what the answer is (and neither does anybody else). Modern theories of 
fundamental physics and cosmology include both possibilities among the respectable 
proposals.54” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Rosen’s work carries forward the phenomenological thinking of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who sought to address the 
deep problem of subject-object dualism, a problem that haunts contemporary theoretical physics, particularly in the fields of 
quantum mechanics and quantum gravity (see Rosen 2008a/b). 
51 What is more appealing in this gedanken experiment is the possibility to investigate the superposition of multiple experienced 
(subjective) ideal body phenomena resulting in an observed/registered (objective) reality, an outcome that could be related to 
quantum computing and communication.  
52 Just because time does not appear in an equation does not necessarily mean that it does not exist. A novice can quickly refer to 
the equation for conservation of mechanical energy in the Bernoulli effect, which does not contain time because it is not needed 
for the derivation of this equation. But when he or she observes the action of a pumping hair spray, he or she also detects time in 
action: the liquid becomes atomized.  
53 http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/10/18/is-time-real/.  
54 The Big Bang and Big Crunch theories, for instance, imply that time must be real, since it emerges in the process of expansion 
of the universe. 
Finally, Fotini Markopoulou argues that the problem of time is a paradox, stemming from an 
unstated faulty premise: the faulty assumption that space is real, (Markopoulou, 2008). She 
suggests that what does not fundamentally exist is not time, but space, geometry and gravity. 
Of course, this could be a valid assumption that nobody questioned, even phenomenologists. 
Why should not be space an illusion? In this case the quantum theory of gravity would be 
spaceless and not timeless. Markopoulou claims that if we are willing to throw out space from 
physics, we can keep time and the trade is worth it. But this goes back again to “Wheeler’s 
loop” about symmetry and invariance cited above. This is because if time and space become 
mutually interchangeable, as Markopoulou implies, such symmetry suggests a more subtle 
principle deeper than either. Much of that knowledge should be comprehended 
metaphorically, “as a means to opening the mind to new insights”  (Blake, 2003, p. 96). Thus, 
asking physicists “What is real55?” is a question that would please philosophers. Obviously, 
we can hypothesize about getting rid of either time or space.  
 
“There are two kinds of people in quantum gravity. Those who think that 
timelessness is the most beautiful and deepest insight in general relativity, if not 
modern science, and those who simply cannot comprehend what timelessness can 
mean and see evidence for time in everything in nature. What sets this split of 
opinions apart from any other disagreement in science is that almost no one ever 
changes their mind…”  (Markopoulou, 2008). 
 
Markopoulou’s “time-for-space replacement” approach is extended in Shu’s transformational 
“No Big Bang Theory” (Shu, 2010), a “Steady State” universe without beginning and end but 
alternating periods of expansion and contraction. It reminds of a partial solution of Alexander 
Friedman’s dynamic (“oscillating” or ”pulsating”) universe, capable of expansion, 
contraction, collapse and emergence in a singularity (Friedman, 1922). Shu’s idea is that time 
and space are not independent entities. They can be converted back and forth between each 
other. In his formulation of the geometry of spacetime, the speed of light is simply the 
conversion factor between the two. Similarly, mass and length are interchangeable in a 
relationship in which the conversion factor depends on both the gravitational constant G and 
the speed of light, neither of which need be constant. Thus, as the Universe expands, mass 
and time are converted to length and space and vice versa as it contracts. The behaviors of the 
different kinds of universes with peculiar interflections of the space and time depend 
presumably on their energetic (and informational?) status.  
 
The confusion about the multiplicity of physical theories on the nature of time to this moment 
is almost complete. The situation appears to philosophers (incl. those reviewing this paper) 
even more frustrating. Almost 100 years after the Einstein-Bergson debate (Canales, 2015), 
the confrontation between the camps of physicists and phenomenologists does not look any 
different today. Why do we draw such parallels between the debates on time’s validity as it 
occurs inside and outside of physics?  
 
The first successful attempt to provide a unified picture of the physical world from micro and 
macro perspectives was made in the mid 1960s with the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (DeWitt, 
1967). It combined the previously incompatible mathematical concepts of general relativity 
and quantum mechanics with the hindsight of a theory of quantum gravity. The price of this 
innovation was that time played no role in this equation of a “united universe” where nothing 
ever happens. The association with the equation for adiabatic extension of the ideal gas and 
Deutsch’s clue on Wheeler’s conclusion about the indicative nature of symmetry and 
invariance discussed earlier rise up again. This conundrum, known as “the problem of time” 
in physics, was resolved by Page and Wooters, who suggested a novel solution based on the 
idea of quantum entanglement56 (Page & Wooters, 1983).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 To a nominalist reality is a social construction. [personal correspondence with Stanley Salthe, June 2015] 
56 See also footnote 27 on quantum correlation.	  
They suggested that a pair of entangled particles evolve in a way that reminds a kind of clock 
that can be used to measure changes. However, the result depends on how the observation is 
made. One way of doing this is to have an external observer outside the universe measuring 
the evolution of the particles using an external clock. In this case, Page and Wooters showed 
that this external observer would not detect any changes in the particles. Hence, time would 
not exist on a global scale (for God).  But, if the observer57 is located inside the universe, s/he 
would realize a change in the evolution of the particles, compared to everything else in the 
universe (for us, humans).  
 
This is an important and powerful idea, suggesting that time is an emergent phenomenon 
because of the nature of entanglement. Until recently, it has been considered as a kind of 
mathematical-philosophical curiosity; physicists saw little chance of ever testing it.  
 
In 2013 Moreva and collaborators delivered first tests of Page and Wootters’ “emergent time 
entanglement” theory (Moreva et al., 2013). The experiment was about the creation of a toy 
universe consisting of only a pair of entangled photons with an observer able to measure their 
state in one of two modes: endo and exo. In the first case, one of the photons is treated like a 
clock with a tick that can alternate between horizontal and vertical polarization. An internal 
observer reading this clock (first photon) will affect58 the polarization value of the second 
photon because of entanglement, thus becoming a part of the small universe, i.e. an obserpant 
in Vrobel’s sense (Vrobel, 2013).  The observer is then able to gauge the polarization value of 
the other (second) photon based on quantum probabilities. S/he then compares the 
measurement of the polarization of the first photon with the one of the second photon. The 
resulting difference is a measure of time. When passing through a thicker quartz plate photons 
experience different degrees of change. Repeating the experiment with plates of different 
thicknesses confirms that the second photon's polarization varies with time. Thus, the 
obserpant can measure the evolution of the system by becoming entangled with it. In the 
second case, s/she is outside the universe measuring the quantum state of the entangled 
photon pair and its evolution against an external clock, which is entirely independent of the 
toy universe. From that viewpoint, the state of the whole system is always the same, giving 
the appearance of a static universe where nothing happens; time does not emerge. Thus, the 
exotic hypothesis of Page-Wootters was placed on solid experimental grounds. Since 
physicists have recently become excited about the idea that gravity is an emergent 
phenomenon related to the thermodynamical aspects of gravity (Padmanabhan, 2009) and 
Verlinde’s entropic gravity59 theory (Verlinde, 2011), it is a relatively small step to presume 
that time could emerge in a similar way.  
 
The experiment of Moreva’s group is important, not only because it demonstrates how 
emergent gravity may take place, but also because it implies that quantum mechanics and 
general relativity are not so incompatible as initially assumed. The next step to be taken 
towards quantum gravity would be to scale up and make the transition to cosmology. It’s one 
thing to show how time emerges for photons, and quite another to show how it emerges for 
larger objects such as galaxies. Viewed through the perspective of quantum entanglement and 
the works of Page, Wooters and Moreva’s team, there is indeed no “problem of time” with 
Wheeler-DeWitt’s “time-excluding equation”. However, not everyone agrees that this is the 
correct route to unification of the quantum and classical worlds. For instance, Smolin and 
Mangabeira argue that every correct description of the Universe must include time, even at 
the expense of dethroning mathematics as the oracle of sciences (Smolin, 2013; Mangabeira 
& Smolin, 2014). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 observer-participant, obserpant, in Vrobel’s sense (Vrobel, 2013)	  
58 Again, correlation is not causation (cf. footnote 27).  A measured polarization value of the first photon can have implications 
about measurements of the second (in the past, present or future), but no effect on them.  
59 http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Entropic_gravity.  
Another recent theory, also grounded on quantum entanglement, explains energy dissipation 
in terms of quantum information and communication rather than statistical law distribution 
used in thermodynamics so far. It could also possibly give us the answer to the fundamental 
question about the source of the irreversible arrow of time, and hence about the nature of time 
itself. In their 2009 article, Linden and colleagues demonstrate that energy disperses and 
objects equilibrate, because of the way elementary particles become intertwined during their 
interactions (Linden et al., 2009). Thus, physical systems reach equilibrium, or a state of 
uniform energy distribution, within an infinite “amount of time”60 by becoming quantum 
mechanically entangled with their surroundings. Does not this sound similar to the stance of 
ontological phenomenology? This connection becomes perhaps clearer when taking into 
account the role of the observer in QM. Obviously, elementary particles cannot be conceived 
in purely objective terms: the entanglement of particles is inseparable from the entanglement 
of observer and observed. In phenomenological terms, this corresponds to the entanglement 
of subject and object underlying Merleau-Ponty’s temporal depth dimension, which can be 
related to Heidegger’s notion of true time.  
 
Hence, the unidirectional time’s arrow can be said to “emerge” from Heidegger’s “true time” 
notion, with the latter put in relation to QM61. This suggests an identification of a completely 
entangled sub-Planckian world with the profoundly intertwined world of Merleau-Ponty’s 
“brute Being” (1969, p. 211).  
 
These results certainly resonate with earlier work on quantum information (Lloyd, 2007). It 
becomes clear that as objects interact with their surroundings — as, for instance, the fluid 
particles in a hot cup of coffee collide with the air — information about their properties leaks 
out and becomes dispersed over the entire environment. This local information loss causes the 
state of the coffee to stop changing (“in time”?), even as the pure state of the entire room 
continues to evolve, except for rare, random fluctuations. Consequently, a cold cup of coffee 
does not spontaneously warm up. Hence the continuous increase of entropy stated in the 
second law of thermodynamics is interpreted to be the result of the loss of information 
through quantum entanglement. Thus the appraisal puzzling generations of physicists that the 
arrow of time does not seem to follow from the underlying laws of physics, which work in the 
same manner when going forwards and backwards “in time”, has probably found its physical 
explanation “without time62”. Today, Linden, Lloyd and their colleagues regard the arrow of 
time (process) differently and reckon that information becomes increasingly dispersed, but it 
never disappears entirely. They believe that even if entropy increases locally, the overall 
entropy of the universe remains constant at zero. This is a very interesting claim, in particular 
with respect to the emergence and evolution of life, mind and consciousness as related to 
quantum entanglement with the surrounding environment.  
 
The standard explanation for “time's arrow” experienced in our expanding universe has been 
that it is an emergent property of thermodynamics’ Second Law imposed at special initial 
conditions. Barbour and colleagues demonstrate that this is not the case. They suggest a 
cosmological hypothesis about the existence of a “parallel universe with backwards time” that 
has emerged at the Big Bang simultaneously with ours (Barbour et al., 2014).  The idea goes 
back again to the finding that nearly all known laws of physics look exactly the same without 
regard to time’s direction. The researchers used the Newtonian n-body problem as the 
simplest nontrivial time-symmetric law to model a dynamically closed universe. They studied 
a computer simulation of 1000 point-like particles interacting under gravitational force.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Again, do we need this quantization of time or can we not get rid of it? Don’t we speak of a process? 
61 Similarly to energy, we could regard time as an extended complex valued variable, such as a quaternion (Chappell, 2012). This 
assumption could lead us to a unified theory of quantum theory and thermodynamics, which would let thermodynamics "emerge" 
already at the microscopic level instead of only at the macroscopic one. 
62 But one could still ask: “Doesn’t loss of information also take time to occur?” 
The system’s dynamic behavior was investigated using a measure of its complexity, 
corresponding to the ratio of the distance between the system's closest pair of particles and the 
distance between the most widely separated particle pair. Because of the special properties of 
the system all typical solutions fall into two groups at a uniquely defined point. In each one of 
them, the measure of complexity varies, but grows irreversibly between rising boundaries 
from that point. During this process indicated with complexity growth, structures storing 
dynamical information are created and act as “records” of the universe history. The authors 
have shown that essentially every configuration of particles would evolve into a low-
complexity state analogous to the Big Bang. Each solution can be regarded then as having a 
single past and two distinct futures emerging from it. For an internal observer (obserpant) 
situated in one half of the solution and aware of the records only of that part of the expanding 
universe, there will be a unique past and a unique future direction (“time’s arrow”) deducible 
from the available records. The obtained results from the computer simulation are considered 
by Barbour and colleagues to be a proof of (another relativistic) principle that all the solutions 
of a time-symmetric dynamical (global) law have strongly time-asymmetric (local) behaviors 
for internal observers. This interesting outcome could be also regarded as a special 
instantiation of Everett’s multiverse theory (Everett, 1957a/b). 
 
Philosophy has been a permanent companion of science over the ages. In the past century, 
thinkers like Kuhn and Popper have contributed a lot for the development of scientific 
thought and standards (e.g. Popper, 1935; Kuhn, 1962). In particular, Karl Popper was 
favoring radiation over entropy increase as the source of irreversibility and the arrow of time 
(Popper, 1956; 1957; 1965; 1967) simply because he regarded Boltzmann’s statistical theory 
unacceptable. His predilections were not proven to be correct: the real source of time’s 
asymmetry is currently considered to be cosmology and gravitation (e.g. Barbour et al., 
2014). However, the mere fact of scrutinizing scientific questions from a number of different 
perspectives established as “the” touchstone for the scientific merit of a theory its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. It was accepted and adopted by generations of 
scientists up to the present day. This method is challenged now. Physics has been increasingly 
seduced in favor of more demanding theories which could hardly offer falsifiability.  
 
An innocent bystander could get the impression that all these efforts to explain anything in 
the world, incl. the nature of time and consciousness, by means of QM are in effect attempts 
to aggrandize the entire universe into one big quantum formulation. Ancient philosophers and 
future generations could rightly ask us today: “Is this ambition to make the world generally as 
equally ununderstandable as QM a way to make QM more palatable?”   
 
Should not we worry about, deliberate on and debate this increasing monocultural orientation 
tendency in physics, and not only in physics, in the past few decades? Should not we 
recognize the possibility that some quantum field phenomena beyond electromagnetism (e.g. 
strings) could have been thought out and constructed (engineered) by way of experiments 
matching adopted and developed formalisms to explain them? They are not discovered in the 
way e.g. the new distant galaxy EGS-zs8-1or the double helix structure of the DNA. Is there 
any evidence for their existence in the actual world, outside the smart mathematics of the bold 
theories and the machinery of the experiments with anticipated results? Should not we look 
for alternative theories and explanations of the Universe? Perhaps we should afford asking 
these provoking questions now, before the crisis of physics (Smolin, 2006; Frank & Gleiser, 
2015) deepens too much. On the other hand, we know well there cannot be a paradigm 
change without a crisis (Kuhn, 1962). Thus, crisis is good.  
 
“QM engineering” has been an expensive venture. If it does not justify the investments soon, 
with the detection of supersymmetry as experimental proof of the beautiful M/string theory, 
physics may have to be redefined as scientific discipline. But we need to keep the same 
standards for all sciences without exception, don’t we?  
 
It is clear that in order to complete the transition to a Unified Theory and understand how it 
works the link to general relativity remains to be made. Why should we put all the eggs in just 
one basket? “Men seem inclined to react to a problem either by putting forward some theory 
and clinging to it as long as they can (if it is erroneous, they may even perish with it, rather 
than give it up), or by fighting against such a theory, once they have seen its weaknesses.” 
(Popper, 1963). Therefore, these dialectic processes of confrontation and development are 
normal. Popper also remarked that the dogmatic approach of sticking to a theory as long as 
possible is of significant importance. “Without it we could never find out what it is in a theory 
– we should give the theory up, before we had a real opportunity of finding out its strength.” 
 
The question about the nature of time still remains one of the greatest riddles of physics. We 
cannot say if quantum theory helped any further to lift the curtain on it. But something needs 
to be done about it. Maybe physicists should begin studying time perception63 and Husserl’s 
phenomenological concept of internal time-consciousness (Husserl, 1991; Heidegger, 1996; 
Varela, 1999; Kortooms, 2002).  
 
“But we must not forget that all things in the world are connected with one another 
and depend on one another, and that we ourselves and all our thoughts are also a part 
of nature. It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by time. 
Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction, at which we arrive by means of the change 
of things; made because we are not restricted to any one definite measure, all being 
interconnected.” (Mach, 1893). 
 
* * * 
 
The goal of this paper was to reaffirm that time duration is an abstraction (Mach) and to 
appraise internal time-consciousness (Husserl). The remaining hard issue is how to integrate 
these two aspects into a single coherent body for research. If one starts with Husserl, what 
should be answered first is the question of how experiences at large could already be latent in 
time-experiences of the individual. Once this has been clarified, the next step should be to 
identify the nature of an agency for the succeeding abstraction along Mach’s line. Maybe the 
notion of delays could bridge these two projections. For instance, we could think of them as 
blind spots in the obserpants that have been fully compensated regarding their simultaneity 
(Vrobel, 2015). I will come back to this later after discussing another approach. 
 
The different aspects of abstract unbound time and internal conscious time can be explored 
with Skow’s adaptation of the Block Universe theory64 (Skow, 2005, 2015) mentioned earlier. 
Accordingly, time does not pass or move inside space. It is not frozen at one omnipresent 
moment either. Skow reckons that time should be regarded as a dimension of spacetime being 
part of the basic fabric of the universe, which is what relativity theory holds. However, 
objects in this model are considered not located at a single moment, but spread out “in time”, 
just in the way they are spread out “in space”; hence the term “Block Universe”. Skow 
believes that events do not happen once to vanish forever. They simply exist on par in 
different parts of the spacetime, but there is no way to link the same “timed” objects, which 
means no time travel.  
 
This model of the Block Universe was extended with the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST), 
which allows that the past and the future exist on a level with the present. Accordingly, 
spacetime has a temporal metric and a temporal orientation with instants of time pictured as 
points without extensions or as the “tips of backward-facing light cones, possibly softened in 
some quantum or twistor way: local in all four dimensions”65.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Time_perception; The Experience and Perception of Time: Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/.  
64 to be dated back to Minkovski’s 4D spacetime model (1908) and McTaggart's B-Theory of time (1908).	  
65 [personal correspondence with Tim Poston, July 2015] 
However, only one moment (at a time) is regarded as absolutely present, and that moment 
keeps changing, as if a spotlight were moving over it.  
 
The Moving Spotlight Theory is said to be compatible with Special Relativity (Skow, 2008). 
There is also a mirroring between the temporal structure of spacetime and the structure of 
supertime, a dimension similar to time, but not time; it is said to be distinct and disconnected 
from it and makes the transition to the relativistic theory. Skow did not mention 
phenomenology, but his attempt to render “scattered” time existence within relativism 
appears still sufficiently self-consistent, even allowing for an extension towards the “moving 
spotlight” version, to be interesting for research on the boundary between physical and 
psychical phenomena.  
 
One could speculate further about how to integrate the different endo and exo relativistic 
models of time, also with respect to a possible realization of a perceptual demonstrator as an 
AI device or an ALife organism (Smith, 2012). But what can be said about a unified approach 
to exophysical and endophysical quantum concepts of time, such as e.g. the (cor-)relation 
between (shared) non-local experiences and geomagnetic fluctuations, a physical 
phenomenon that phenomenological philosophers have not considered (to my knowledge) in 
their research yet? 
 
Let us come back to the Vrobel type of fully compensated delays to bridge abstract and 
experienced time mentioned six paragraphs above. It is interesting to note that there is 
ongoing research on physical time delays by Koroatev and colleagues (Korotaev et al., 2003; 
2005) confirming the results of earlier work by Kozyrev’s team on the experimental 
investigation of the properties of time (Kozyrev, 1971; 1980). They have found delayed 
correlations between solar activity and geoelectromagnetic patterns with long time delays. 
Their results basically boil down to macroscopic nonlocality, a correlation of different 
dissipative processes without any local carriers of interaction (Korotaev et al. 1999; 2000; 
2002), which can be regarded as an example of a “physical expanded now” on a large scale.  
 
These objectified time delay phenomena were also registered as consequences of 
geomagnetic storms66 entering hidden portals67 in the geomagnetic field causing magnetic 
reconnection68 and the so-called “Sedona effect” correlations (Miller & Lonetree, 2013) 
between geomagnetic anomalies, EEG brainwaves and Schumann resonances69. This suggests 
a dependency that philosophical phenomenologists have not considered in their research so 
far: that human beings and other inhabitants of the planet Earth are most probably subjected 
to such cosmic delays too and that our sensations, moods, thoughts, theories, abstractions are 
also influenced by them70. Geomagnetic disturbances can disrupt cell phone services, damage 
satellites and knock out power grids. But also our physical complaints do not leave any doubt 
about such a relationship (Greenwald, 2015). Biophysicists know well that our bodies are not 
Faraday cages and human consciousness cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. Yet, 
they may also err in their logic, in particular with respect to biosemiotics (Kull, 2015). 
 
Let us come back again to the interpretation of time in relativity theory, which I would like to 
comment from a bit different perspective. Minkowski’s idea of a space-time continuum 
(1909) merged the three real spatial dimensions with an imaginary one of time ict, with a 
basic unit imaginary producing the correct spacetime distance x2 - c2t2, thus providing an 
explanation for Einstein’s special relativity theory in terms of the structure of space and time.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 disturbances of the Earth's magnetosphere caused by a solar wind shock wave and/or a solar magnetic field cloud interacting 
with the Earth's magnetic field. 
67 https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/sunearth/news/mag-portals.html. 
68 a fundamental physics process in which magnetic field lines come together and explosively realign, causing particles in the 
high-density magnetic field area to be accelerated close to the speed of light. 
69 http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Schumann_resonances.  
70 [personal correspondence with Susie, Vrobel, 14. May 2015] 
 
In 2012 Chappell and colleagues propose an alternative to a planar Minkowski space-time of 
two space dimensions and one time dimension (Chappell et al., 2012), by replacing the 
imaginary complex number unit i with the Clifford bivector i=e1e2, the square of which is 
also minus one, but can be included without the addition of an extra dimension, as it is an 
integral part of the real Cartesian plane with the orthonormal basis e1 and e2. The authors 
reckon that with this model of planar spacetime, using a 2D Clifford multivector, the 
spacetime metric and the Lorentz transformations follow immediately as properties of the 
underlying algebra. This also leads to momentum and energy being represented as 
components of a multivector. Chappell and colleagues provide an efficient derivation of 
Compton’s scattering formula, and a simple formulation of Dirac’s and Maxwell’s equations. 
Based on the mathematical structure of the multivector, they produce a semi-classical model 
of massive particles, which can then be viewed as the origin of the Minkowski spacetime 
structure and thus a deeper explanation for relativistic effects. The authors also claim to have 
found “a new perspective on the nature of time, which is given a precise mathematical 
definition” as the bivector of the plane. They should be kindly reminded that a richer and 
more elegant mathematical model of time was proposed over 40 years ago by Charles A. 
Musès based on his hypernumber concept, which he elaborated throughout his lifetime (cf. 
e.g. Musès, 1972; 1977; 1983; 1985; 1994). This work was cheerfully ignored, although there 
is practically no excuse for missing the discussion of such essential references by experts in 
the field (incl. the reviewers at PLOS ONE) today. Unfortunately, such cases of superficial 
recherché (if not worse) practices are quite frequent with an increasing tendency in modern 
scientific literature, despite easier access to digital content and search engine optimization.  
 
Thus, authors publish sometimes redundant or less significant works finding lame pretexts in 
the frantic principle “publish or perish”. Why does this happen? Why did producing and 
accelerating publications (at any price!) became the dominating criteria for success in 
science? Is it possible to avoid “happy ignorance” and “innocent borrowings” of older ideas 
without paying tribute to the original authors? Is not time to introduce more stringent quality 
criteria beyond speedy peer reviewing, impact indexing and ranking digests, which are 
obviously insufficient methods for assessing scientific excellence in the modern “Big Data” 
driven world? Is not time for a paradigm shift from quantity to quality in science? Would not 
be better if authors are given more time to think, study, discuss and work on a theme?  
 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
I hope that my contemplations “left the vast darkness of the subject unobscured” to the reader, 
as a friend reported what Bateson told him about Whitehead’s response to a talk on quantum 
mechanics. He added that the “gift“ character of time’s now cannot be appreciated enough, 
neither in science, nor in philosophy: “The now is epiphany. Time is dream-substance. And 
personalized at that.” Heidegger noted that we can only say of Being es gibt, “it gives”71. And  
— by way of emphasizing the intimacy of Being and time — he suggested that time is the 
horizon of Being. Beyond Merleau-Ponty’s concept of (temporal) depth (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945) and Vrobel’s concept of (temporal) density (Vrobel, 2015), phenomenological time 
certainly has also intrinsic color, sound, scent, taste and texture in a moment of joy or sorrow, 
as personal as it can be. Is it so important to us, because we all (including philosophers) are 
mortal? How do we know what we know?  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Heidegger took the unusual step of working with the non-idiomatic, literal meaning of es gibt (“there is”): “it gives.” He did 
this to emphasize that Being or “true time” entails an active process of giving. This is where the gift (“das Geschenk“, „die 
Gabe“) comes from. 
3. Epilogue  
 
What I realized when studying the diverse threads of thought concerning time on both sides 
of the divide between physics (as representative of science) and phenomenological 
philosophy – but also within physics itself – is that the major differences between the diverse 
viewpoints, compacted in what each side is missing to understand the other, are those of 
Batesonian kind: the little bits of anticipated information that each discipline and each 
opinion imply as known and shared (axioms). “What we mean by information — the 
elementary unit of information — is a difference which makes a difference, and it is able to 
make a difference because the neural pathways along which it travels and is continually 
transformed are themselves provided with energy. The pathways are ready to be triggered. 
We may even say that the question is already implicit in them.” (Bateson, 1972, p. 336). In 
other words, we always need to know some second order logic, and presuppose a second 
order of “order” (cybernetics) usually shared within a distinct community, to realize what a 
certain claim, hypothesis or theory means. In Matsuno’s opinion72 Bateson’s phrase “must be 
a prototypical example of second-order logic in that the difference appearing both in the 
subject and predicate can accept quantification. Most statements framed in second-order logic 
are not decidable. In order to make them decidable or meaningful, some qualifier73 needs to 
be used. A popular example of such a qualifier is a subjective observer. However, the point is 
that the subjective observer is not limited to Alice or Bob in the QBist74 parlance”. This is 
what I wished to emphasize when trying to understand the different viewpoints in logic of 
mathematicians, physicists and philosophers in the dispute about the existence of time in the 
beginning of this essay. An essential aspect of this “implicate order” (Bohm, 1980) can be 
seen in the grammatical formulation of theses such as the law of motion:  
“While it is legitimate in its own light, the physical law of motion alone framed in 
eternal time referable in the present tense, whether in classical or quantum mechanics, 
is not competent enough to address how the now could be experienced. … 
Measurement differs from the physical law of motion as much as the now in 
experience differs from the present tense in description. The watershed separating 
between measurement and the law of motion is in the distinction between the now 
and the present tense. Measurement is thus subjective and agential in making a 
punctuation at the moment of now.” (Matsuno, 2015). 
 
In particular, the distinction between experiencing and capturing experience of time in terms 
of language is made explicit in Heidegger’s Being and Time: “… by passing away constantly, 
time remains as time. To remain means: not to disappear, thus, to presence. Thus time is 
determined by a kind of Being. How, then, is Being supposed to be determined by time?” 
(Heidegger, 1969/1972, p. 3). Matsuno’s comment on this is: “Time passing away is an 
abstraction from accepting the distinction of the grammatical tenses, while time remaining as 
time refers to the temporality of the durable now prior to the abstraction of the tenses.” 
(Matsuno, 2015). Therefore, when trying to understand the “local logics/phenomenologies” of 
the individual disciplines (mathematics physics, philosophy, etc., incl. their fields), one 
should be aware of the fact that the capabilities of our scientific language (usually English) 
are not limitless: “the now of the present moment is movable and dynamic in updating the 
present perfect tense in the present progressive tense. That is to say, the now is prior and all of 
the grammatical tenses including the ubiquitous present tense are the abstract derivatives from 
the durable now”, (Matsuno, 2015). This presupposes the adequacy of mathematical 
abstractions specifically invented or adopted and elaborated for the expression of more 
sophisticated modalities of time’s now than those currently used in such formalisms as 
temporal logic (e.g. TLA, Lamport, 1994; 2002). There is much to be explored in what other 
languages and cultures deliver to physics (e.g. Peat, 1996).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Koichiro Matsuno on FIS (http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis,  27.06.2015).	  
73 italics by the author in this paragraph. 
74 Quantum Bayesianism: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Quantum_Bayesianism.  
 
Finally, let us discuss shortly the epistemology of time in physics. Stepney (2014) 
investigated interesting aspects of local vs. global physical and computational time related to 
“Newtonian” or differential (t + dt) and “Lagrangian” or integral  (∫L dt) least action models 
of motion in classical physics. The discussion is carried along Wharton’s argument (Wharton, 
2012) claiming that (classical von Neuman - Turing) computation used today is essentially 
Newtonian iterative calculation75, whereas the (quantum) universe (e.g. Stapp, 2007) at its 
heart is most naturally described in a least action Lagrangian formulation, and hence the 
universe is not a computer in the classical sense. Wharton’s argument is of course not correct 
in Feynman’s context (Feynman, 1982; 1985) regarding computing for physics, which 
ultimately led to a whole field of research on quantum computation. Certainly, any other kind 
of unconventional computing relevant to Stepney’s discussion (neural networks, reaction-
diffusion chemical systems, cellular, DNA, field and optical computing, etc.) is also not 
adequate to Wharton’s interpretation.  The question, however, which modes of computation 
(and hence, implicitly, which aspects of time used in them) are appropriate in naturalistic 
physical models and simulations is still valid. This certainly involves the definition of initial 
and boundary conditions. However, they appear nondeterministic outside the Newtonian 
scheme. The universe is a complex evolving system characterized by always emerging and 
disappearing elements and properties, which are traditionally handled from a third person 
perspective in physics. Phenomenology does not play a practical role in physics today. How 
can we define an adequate model of the physical universe then? Is it possible to ultimately 
comprehend it or we can only capture some fractal, “local” aspects of what the universe 
means to us as individuals participating a community with shared knowledge?  
 
Hankey’s article in this special issue is addressing the interesting aspect of how to find a 
complexity basis for phenomenology through information states at criticality points (Hankey, 
2015). It becomes apparent that the issue of time requires integrated phenomenological 
treatment in physics. Most physicists, however, such as David Ritz Finkelstein and Gordana 
Dodig-Crnkovic76 do not see any reason to introduce phenomenology into physics. They 
consider endophysics (Rössler, 1987; 1998) as “just fine” and “objective” (inter-subjective) 
third-person account of the introspective aspect of physical systems. In particular Dodig-
Crnkovic regards cognition as the way for capturing agency in the course of the subject-object 
interactions. She considers phenomenology as a second order phenomenon capturing the 
experience of the individual observer rather than the object under observation. Dodig-
Crnkovic reckons that physics is about agency, not about experience, which belongs to the 
domains of psychology, philosophy and art. I will come back again to Hankey’s model. 
 
Stepney was, however, pursuing a different question while wishing to understand 
computation as physical phenomenon: “Can we make our computations more physics-like?” 
Her answer was “Yes” when addressing unconventional computational architectures based on 
physical processes.  However, asking the reverse question of whether mathematics and 
computation in the broad sense (and not physics!) can be regarded as the foundations of our 
physical universe appears also valid. Thus, Marchal claims that arithmetic, or any first order 
logical specification of any Turing universal system, is the foundation of everything, mind 
and matter, (Marchal, 2004; 2013). He demonstrates that this logical conclusion follows from 
the hypothesis of computationalism and a minimal amount of Occam razor reasoning. 
Refuting Marchal’s argument appears to be a real challenge for both physicists and 
mathematicians, if they take it seriously. But we discussed earlier that logical incompatibility 
between the different disciplines makes such efforts difficult (see also Kull, 2015). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The problem with assuming that all physics can be calculated using iterative methods applied to differential equations (second 
order PDEs) is that Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics showed that systems with feedback require integro-differential equations for 
their elucidation, which introduce immense complications when trying to solve them. The nonlinearities in critical phenomena 
are examples in this respect. Therefore, we possibly need new different mathematical approaches for capturing such phenomena.   
76 [personal correspondence] 
Nevertheless, physicists like Stepney and Dodig-Crnkovic argue that physics, which is the 
world that acts, is primary and not its representation in an agent such as a human’s mind in 
the form of arithmetic, symmetry or any second-order phenomenon that emerges77 from that 
substrate. This is again a fundamental epistemological hallmark. At the end it is not the 
question of who is right or wrong in this discussion about the foundations of our physical 
universe, but where a scientist or philosopher feels at home and what he or she considers as 
primary. If a mathematician reasons at the abstract level of symmetries and logic then he or 
she can express everything else in the universe in terms of logic and arithmetic. A physicist, 
however, could be interested to understand how exactly arithmetic and computation emerge 
from a living cognitive substrate, but he or she would not question the existence of the 
physical world outside of that substrate! Philosophically, both positions belong to the two 
opposite traditions of the Platonic and Aristotelian interpretations of the world. There is no 
final resolution in the favor of one or the other. It is a dynamic, dialectic unity of opposites, 
akin to the discourse about free will and its relations to upward and downward causation 
discussed by Felix Hong in the complement to this special issue (Hong, 2015) and its 
predecessor article on the role of pattern recognition in scientific research (Hong, 2013). We 
know more if we accept both viewpoints for what they are and look for their synergies.  
 
Yet, there is something new in distributed computation from a physicist’s perspective. 
Newton and the modern era physicists did not think in terms of networks to this moment. 
Whereas classical physics discusses the one-, two- and many-body problems, complex 
networks with multiple feedbacks (Simeonov, 2002) introduce a new (emerging) 
phenomenon, in particular with nonlinear criticalities, and interconnected time structures 
could be different. This is also an essential characteristic of living systems, which I am going 
to discuss in a sequel article. 
 
Time is obviously a phenomenon at the interface between (human) mind and the physical 
world. We may not be able to answer completely the fundamental question we set out to, but 
we can acquire important insights in many fields of crucial importance for humanity if 
disciplines go hand-in-hand when dealing with this concept and continue the dialogue. The 
first step beyond the frame of mathematics and natural sciences was made in this special issue 
extending our hand to phenomenological philosophy, which has been considering an entirely 
different approach to time and other dualistic (endo and exo) phenomena in the past 500 
years.  
 
Our belief is that both fields, science and philosophy, can mutually enhance each other again 
when working on a common language/logic, as it was the case a few centuries ago. We 
should regain our lost ability to understand each other because of the increased fragmentation 
of knowledge.  
 
While being recognized as physicist, Galileo Galilei was also probably among the first 
phenomenologists of time in history. As the story goes, when being a student of medicine at 
the University of Pisa, he visited the cathedral at Vallombrosa and observed a lamp hanging 
from the ceiling swaying in perfect rhythm. The young scholar checked immediately his own 
pulse to ascertain his observations and was fascinated that the lamp took the same amount of 
time to swing, no matter how large the range of swinging. Being a son of a music teacher, he 
must have had a quite good sense of rhythmic movement. Curiously enough, Galileo used 
these insights later in his studies on pendulums and clocks.  
 
We need to devise a way of integrating knowledge, reasoning and intuition like Rennaissance 
and “Vitruvian” men of all ages did (Capra, 2008; 2013). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 But how do we know that the physics itself as we know it is not such a second-order emergent phenomenon? 
It was not my intention to present a satisfactory response to the question “What is time?” in 
this essay. Rather, I wished to emphasize that the basic challenge we have at hand is that of 
integrating a number of different descriptions from and between different disciplines, as well 
as within the disciplines themselves, as shown here in the case with physics. What we need is 
to understand these concepts and their domains, to know their adequate frame of reference in 
order to correctly apply them to other domains. In particular, we should become able to 
capture and represent the subtle nature of time in the ideas of Gebser (1962) and Portmann 
(1952) we began this essay with. At the same time we should try to overcome the paradoxical 
limits of science reflected in a vivid illustration about the substantiality of the quantum 
domain given by Brian Josephson: 
“Nature [in this regime] behaves rather like an insect that responds to our attempts to 
swat it, utilizing a determination of just where it will be at the appropriate future 
instant, by changing its position. This ensures that our prediction will be incorrect, 
with the result that the insect survives our attempts to dispose of it.”  
   (Josephson, 2014) 
 
Hankey’s work on the realization of self-organized criticality in this issue (Hankey, 2015) 
could provide some basic clues on the way. Backed by previous research in a number of 
disciplines (e.g. Back et al., 1987; Holland, 1992; Penrose, 1994; Kauffman, 1996; Chalmers, 
1997; Back, 1999; Hameroff & Penrose, 2014) the author hypothesizes about this 
phenomenon as an “almost inevitable” mode of operation of complex biological systems, 
allowing the maintenance of switching processes close to criticality to avoid unwanted 
switching blockages. Hankey reckons that this improves the sensitivity of the switching 
processes, i.e. the response-ability, of living systems to environmental changes, which are in 
the core of adaptation, fitness and survival. This mode of operation is supposed to represent a 
form of optimized regulation corresponding to system ‘health’. Hankey’s model of circulating 
information round the criticality loop of a living system supports the realization of a sense of 
self incorporating the intrinsic properties of phenomenological time: i) the immanent sense of 
continuity in time passing, of Heidegger’s ‘Being in Time’, and ii) the inherence of time in 
experience as interpolation between, and connection of (possibly emotionally stressed and 
modulated) successive events. 
 
I hope that the Integral Biomathics approach (Simeonov, 2010; Simeonov et al., 2012; 
Simeonov et al., 2013) will help us advancing fast in the desired direction.  
 
This work is by far from being finished even in its “Part I”. A number of interesting models 
and theories addressing the “problem of time”, such the diverse approaches to quantum 
gravity (Unimodular Gravity, Bigravity, Dilaton Gravity, Massive Gravity, F(R) Gravity, 
Hořava-Lifshitz Gravity, etc.), were omitted to simplify the presentation. The interested 
reader may wish to consider the ones related to quantum local times (Kitada, 1994; Kitada & 
Fletcher, 1996; Jeknić-Dugić et al., 2014), classical and quantum time crystals78 (Shapere & 
Wilczek, 2012; Wilzcek, 2012) and timeless quantum vacuum (Caligiuri and Sorli, 2013; 
Sorli, 2014; Fiscaletti & Sorli, 2014a/b). Other knowledgeable research was not addressed at 
all in this paper for the lack of timespace available to me while co-editing the contributions to 
this special journal issue. However, I wish to honor this inspiring work in my digest about the 
phenomenology of physical time in case that the interested reader wishes to explore more 
about these concepts: Paul Davies (Davies, 1995), Huw Price (Price, 1997; 2002), George 
Jaroszkiewicz (Jaroszkiewicz, 2000; 2001) and Henry Stapp (Stapp, 2007). The key essence 
of these ideas could help us reviving Natural Philosophy as a discipline and lead us towards 
the ‘grand answer’ that the reader may have expected to see at the end of this paper.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 analogous to ordinary crystals in space, representing spontaneous emergence of a clock within a time-invariant dynamical 
system.	  
In the hope that the reader had a good time reading this essay, which I finish now79  
 
 
with a last citation and the aspiration for a sequel in a couple of years: 
 
“The principles … that I have proposed may be false. … But if the idea as a whole is 
false, something else 80  will have to remedy the deficiencies of the prevailing 
conception.” (Deutsch, 2012) 
PLS, Berlin, in July 2015 
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